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I INTRODUCTION
The expression 'gross income' is defined in the Income Tax Act1
('the Act') as follows:
'gross income", in relation to any year or period of assessment, means, in the case
of any person, the total amount, in cash or otherwise, received by or accrued to or
in favour of such person during such year or period of assessment from a source
within or deemed to be within the Republic, excluding receipts or accruals of a
capital nature ... '
The objective of this article is twofold: first, to set out the correct
role, in our view, of the notion of causation in the application of two
elements of the definition of gross income-the characterization of an
amount as being from a source within the Republic (or not) and as
being of a capital nature (or not); and secondly, to ascertain the
apportionment implications where two or more causae with differing
tax consequences are found to have given rise to the receipt or accrual
of a single amount.
In his book The Best Defense Professor Alan Dershowitz of Harvard
Law School makes the following wry comments:
'I am reminded of my colleague Alan Stone's observation that there are no Nobel
prizes in law, because law is the only profession where you lose points for
originality and gain points for demonstrating that somebody else thought of your
idea first. Lawyers are prone to look to the "authorities"--to past lawyers and
judges-for their ideas. Creativity in the law consists largely of analyzing past cases
* BA LLB (Witwatersrand) BCom (-ons) (Taxation) MBA (Cape Town), Advocate of the
Supreme Court of South Africa.
t BA LLB BCom (Hons) (Taxation) (Cape Town) LLM Diploma in Comparative Legal
Studies (Cantab), Attorney of the Supreme Court of South Africa.
' Act 58 of 1962, as amended.
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so as to get around a barrier or move the law incrementally. Rarely do lawyers
indulge in bold leaps of faith, in grand conceptual breakthroughs.'
2
It is submitted that several recent tax decisions3 of the Appellate
Division of the Supreme Court have displayed an innovative ap-
proach with often quite dramatic results -something more than
Dershowitz's 'moving the law incrementally'. Certain of these
decisions, discussed below, hold important implications, if our view
is correct, for the role of causation and apportionment in the
determination of a taxpayer's gross income.
II THE NEED TO DETERMINE CAUSATION
(a) Source
Our discussion of the law relating to the determination of the
source of an amount for income-tax purposes is limited to what we
might call the natural source of an amount, as opposed to its deemed
source.
4
There is no definition of 'source' in the Act. The result is that the
principles of law which govern the meaning of 'source' have been laid
down by the courts. The leading case on the subject is Commissioner
for Inland Revenue v Lever Bros & another,5 which has without fail been
followed in subsequent decisions dealing with the question of source.
In the Lever Bros case Watermeyer CJ,. who delivered one of two
majority judgments, made the following authoritative remarks:
'When the question has to be decided whether or not money, received by a
taxpayer, is gross income within the meaning of the definition referred to above,
two problems arise which have not always been differentiated from one another in
decided cases. The first problem is to determine what is the source from which it
has been received and when that has been determined, the second problem is to
locate it in order to decide whether it is or is not within the Union.
'The word "source" has several possible meanings. In this section it is used
figuratively, and when so used in relation to the receipt of money, one possible
meaning is the originating cause of the receipt of the money, another possible
meaning is the quarter from which it is received. A series of decisions of this court
and of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council upon our Income Tax Acts and
upon similar Acts elsewhere have dealt with the meaning of the word "source", and
the inference, I think, which should be drawn from those decisions is that the
source of receipts, received as income, is not the quarter whence they come, but the
originating cause of their being received as income, and that this originating cause
is the work which the taxpayer does to earn them, the quid pro quo which he gives
in return for which he receives them. 
6
2 Alan M Dershowitz The Best Defense: The Courtroom Confrontations of America's Most
Outspoken Lawyer of Last Resort (1982) 307. He goes on to add in parenthesis: 'I recall my high
school Talmud teacher once putting me down with the following "Catch 22" response for
claiming that an idea I had was original: "If what you're saying is such a good idea, then
obviously the old rabbis, who were much smarter than you, must have thought of it first;, and if
the old rabbis, who were much smarter than you, didn't think of it first, then it can't be such a
good idea.'
3 For example, Commissionerfor Inland Revenue v Nemojim (Pty) Ltd 1983 (4) SA 935 (A); De
Beers Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Commissionerfor Inland Revenue 1986 (1) SA 8 (A); Tuck v Commissioner
for Inland Revenue 1988 (3) SA 819 (A).4 The deemed-source provisions are to be found principally in ss 9 and 9A of the Act.
s 1946 AD 441.
6 At 449-50.
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Flowing from the above dictum, it is trite law that the test for the
source of an amount involves a twofold inquiry: what is the
originating cause (quid pro quo) of the amount, and where is that
cause located? There is thus no doubt of the need to determine the
causa giving rise to the receipt or accrual of an amount in order to
discover its source.
(b) Capital or revenue
As in the case of source, there is no definition of the words 'of a
capital nature' in the Act, and the legal principles which govern their
meaning have been laid down by the courts. Unlike in the area of
source, however, judicial precedent has not traditionally directed us
to examine the causa giving rise to the receipt or accrual of an amount
in order to decide whether or not it is of a capital nature. Yet this is
exactly what the tests for capital or revenue require us to do: in most
cases this is so obvious that there has been no need to spell out the
exact nature of the inquiry.
In many cases the distinction between amounts of a capital nature
and amounts of a revenue nature is clear. Amounts received for the
use of assets, or for services rendered, for example, are amounts of a
revenue nature. On the other hand, amounts such as gifts and
inheritances, or the proceeds of the sale of an asset which has been
used as part of one's income-earning structure, are amounts of a
capital nature. The difficulties presented by the need to distinguish
capital amounts from revenue amounts are not theoretical difficulties
of defining what is capital and what is revenue, but practical
difficulties of applying the law to the facts of individual situations.
These difficulties usually arise where there has been a purchase and
subsequent sale of an asset, and it is necessary to determine the capital
or revenue nature of the proceeds. The asset may have been held as an
investment made with the intention of earning income, in which case
the proceeds will be of a capital nature. Alternatively, the asset may
have been held (in a scheme of profit-making) as trading stock with
a view to the profitable resale of it, in which case the proceeds will be
of a revenue nature.
It is not our purpose to embark on a discussion of the nuances of
the well-established tests for distinguishing between capital and
revenue. What concerns us is the nature of the inquiry; more
particularly, the so obvious as to be almost unnoticed role of
causation in this inquiry.
It is our contention that whenever one examines the capital or
revenue nature of an amount received or accrued, one always asks:
what has given rise to this receipt or accrual, or, to borrow the test in
the Lever Bros case, what is the originating cause of the amount received
or accrued?
Two simple examples will illustrate the point. Where a salary is
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received, the originating cause of the receipt is the services rendered,
and one will conclude from the inherent nature of this underlying
causa that the amount received is of a revenue nature. On the other
hand, where a payment is received in return for a restraint-of-trade
undertaking in terms of which the recipient undertakes not to carry
on a trade in a specified area for a specified period of time, the quid
pro quo for or originating cause of the payment received is the
undertaking to refrain from trading as specified. The courts have told
us that this amounts to the sterilization of a capital asset and the
payment received is accordingly of a capital nature.7 Again it is with
reference to the underlying causa that we characterize the payment as
being of a capital nature.
At a later stage we shall consider a more complex example of the
causation of an amount received. At this stage the point being made
is simply that it is the underlying causa which triggers the application
of the tests for capital or revenue.
Thus the two inquiries necessitated by the definition of gross
income regarding the capital or revenue nature and the source of an
amount require as their starting-point a consideration of the causa
giving rise to the amount. In the case of source this is because the
Lever Bros caseS tells us so; in the case of capital and revenue, it is
patent that this is fundamental to all of the tests to be applied, and the
Appellate Division has confirmed that this is so in Tuck v Com-
missioner for Inland Revenue,9 discussed below.
III DETERMINATION OF CAUSATION
In the ascertainment of the source of amounts received or accrued,
the Lever Bros case requires us to determine the originating cause and
specifies that
'this originating cause is the work which the taxpayer does to earn them, the quid
pro quo which he gives in return for which he receives them. The work which he
does may be a business which he carries on, or an enterprise which he undertakes,
or an activity in which he engages and it may take the form of personal exertion,
mental or physical, or it may take the form of employment of capital either by
using it to earn income or by letting its use to someone else. Often the work is some
combination of these.'! 0
In Tuck's case,1 which was concerned with the capital or revenue
nature of shares received by the appellant, Corbett JA expressly
approved the use of the originating cause, or quid pro quo, test for
the purpose of characterizing the receipt of the shares as being of a
capital or revenue nature for income-tax purposes. Having done so,
he went on to ask the following question:
" Taeuber and Corssen (Ply) Ltd v Secretary for Inland Revenue 1975 (3) SA 649 (A) at 663H-664A.
a Supra note 5.
9 1988 (3) SA 819 (A).
0 Per Watermeyer CJ at 450.
1 Supra note 9.
'what work, if any, did the taxpayer do in order to earn the receipt in question,
what was the quid pro quo which he gave for the receipt?
'12
It is of considerable interest that in this context CorbettJA in Tuck's
case paused to consider the question of causation in delict, setting out
the well-established distinction between factual causation (conditio
sine qua non) and legal causation (remoteness), and citing cases such
as Da Silva & another v Coutinho,13 Minister of Police v Skosana,14
Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Coetsee,15 S v DaniEls en 'n ander
t 6
and Siman & Co (Pty) Ltd v Barclays National Bank Ltd. 17 Corbett JA
made the following comments:
'I do not propose to canvass fully the discussion of this question in thesejudgments.
Suffice it to say that it is generally recognized that causation in the law of delict
gives rise to two distinct inquiries. The first, often termed "causation in fact" or
"factual causation", is whether there is a factual link of cause and effect between the
act or omission of the party concerned and the harm for which he is sought to be
held liable; and in this sphere the generally recognized test is that of the conditio sine
qua non or the "but for" test. This is essentially a factual inquiry. Generally speaking
no act or omission can be regarded as a cause in fact unless it passes this test. The
second inquiry postulates that the act or omission is a conditio sine qua non and raises
the question as to whether the link between the act or omission and the harm is
sufficiently close or direct for legal liability to ensue; or whether the harm is, as it
is said, "too remote". This inquiry (sometimes called "causation in law" or "legal
causation") is concerned basically with a juridical problem in which considerations
of legal policy may play a part. One of the factors which may cause the link
between the act or omission and the harm to become too tenuous (resulting in the
harm being too remote) is the intervention of some independent, unconnected and
extraneous causative factor or event, generally termed a novus aaus interveniens. 18
Corbett JA expressed doubt concerning the appropriateness of
applying the principles of causation, as developed in the law of delict
and in criminal law, when characterizing a receipt for income-tax
purposes,19 yet he reverted to these principles later in his judgment
(see below) and seems to have applied them in holding that both the
causae in Tuck's case had to be regarded in law as causally relevant
factors. It is interesting to note that Boberg rejects Corbett JA's
traditional distinction20 between factual and legal causation in delict,
preferring what he calls 'the relative view of negligence', but ac-
knowledges that Skosana's case 21 stands in the way of its acceptance.
22
Boberg states that
'the issue of legal causation holds no terrors for those who take a relative view of
wrongfulness and fault-it simply does not exist. For the active role accorded these
requirements in limiting the actor's liability makes it unnecessary to invoke a
further requirement of legal causation for the purpose. Factual causation is an
2 At 833D-E.
13 1971 (3) SA 123 (A) at 147D-148E.
24 1977 (1) SA 31 (A) at 33A-B, 34F-35D, 43E-44F.
's 1981 (1) SA 1131 (A) at 1138G-1139C.
16 1983 (3) SA 275 (A) at 324F-325E, 331B-333G.
27 1984 (2) SA 888 (A) at 914F-915B.
'e Supra note 9 at 832G-833A.
'9 At 833C.
2o Embodied in Minister of Police , Skosana supra note 14.
22 Supra note 14.
p Q R Boberg The Law of Delia I: Aquilian Liability (1984) 276 and 382.
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entirely sufficient link between harm and conduct where it is further required that
the conduct be wrongful and culpable in relation to the harm that it caused. '2
Boberg's preferred relative view seems particularly remote (no pun
intended) where causation in the context of income tax is concerned,
and it appears to us that the more traditional approach of Corbett
JA-the determination, first, of factual causation and, secondly, of
legal causation-is preferable for income-tax purposes. And where
legal causation, or the remoteness test, is concerned, it is our view
that for income-tax purposes it is only the direct-consequences test,
which looks for the operation of a novus actus interveniens, which is
of any assistance. Further tests, 24 such as the foreseeability test and the
test of adequate causation, appear too closely linked to the question of
negligence, which is generally not a relevant factor when it comes to
the causa of an amount received or accrued.
Whether the principles of legal causation have been received into
our income-tax law in Tuck's cases is not clear. As was noted above,
CorbettJA expressed reservations concerning their appropriateness in
income-tax law and indeed reached the same conclusion by applying
the Lever Bros test, which he expressly favoured. Thus it may be that
Corbett JA's remarks in regard to legal causation are merely obiter
dicta. It is submitted that there can be little doubt, however, that in
a situation where these principles would assist in the determination of
causation for income-tax purposes, the court would not hesitate to
employ them.
Indeed, in Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Shell Southern Africa
Pension Fund2 Nicholas JA expressly applied the principles of legal
causation in the context of paragraph (e) of the definition of gross
income. The issue was whether a lump sum paid by a pension fund,
at the discretion of the pension committee, to the widow of a
deceased member was a lump sum which became recoverable 'in
consequence of' or 'following upon' the death of the member.
Nicholas JA made the following comments:
'The paradigm of the present case is an occurrence A (the death of a member)
which initiates a chain of events leading to the final result B (the recoverability of
the lump sum benefit), one of the intervening events being occurrence C (the
exercise by the committee of its discretion).
'The question is whether the intervening cause C, which contributes to bring
about the result B, is of such a kind that it isolates the original cause A so as to
relegate it "to the status of a merely historical antecedent or background feature".'2
In this case it was found that the decision of the committee did
amount to the intervention of 'an independent, unconnected and
extraneous causative factor or event', s which isolated the death of the
2 Op cit at 439-40.
24 These categories of legal causation are used by Boberg op cit at 440-7.
as Supra note 9.
26 1984 (1) SA 672 (A) at 679B-F.
2 At 679E-G.
28 At 679G-H.
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member from the final result. The lump sum, it was held, had
therefore not become recoverable in consequence of or following
upon the death of the member.
In Transvaal Associated Hide and Skin Merchants (Pty) Ltd v The
Collector of Income Tax,29 decided by the Botswana Court of Appeal,
Schreiner JA, dealing with the source of the proceeds of the sale of
cured hides, and having dismissed the possibility of apportionment
because the appellant had failed to include apportionment as one of
his grounds of objection, stressed the need to choose between the
country where the hides were cured, Botswana, and the country
where they were sold, South Africa. He made the following
comments:
'In such a situation, it has been held that the dominant (or main or substantial or real
and basic) cause of the accrual of the income must be sought.' 30
He then went on to make the following remarks:
'No doubt selling the cured hides is necessary to bring an income to hand, so that
it might be said of the sales, as much as of the curing, that they are a causa sine qua
non of the accrual of the income. But the place where a causa sine qua non exists
cannot be decisive of the place of origin of the income, for there may be a number
of causae sine qua non. One must look for something more-something like the
dominance or the basicality used in the abovementioned list of expressions; or like
what I venture to call the highest, or higher, degree of essentiality.'
3'
The court in the Transvaal Hide case, as is indicated by Schreiner
JA, was obliged to choose between Botswana, where the hides were
cured, and South Africa, where they were sold. In so doing it is
submitted that the court looked for the dominant cause or what
Schreiner JA called the causa with 'the highest, or higher, degree of
essentiality'. The words 'highest or higher' clearly indicate that it was
the dominant causa which was the subject-matter of Schreiner JA's
inquiry.
What is of particular interest is that Schreiner JA appears to have
gone some way towards applying the concepts of factual and legal
causation, referred to above. Indeed, one might ask what difference
there is between the inquiry suggested by Schreiner JA and the
application of the tests for factual causation (causa sine qua non) and
legal causation (remoteness, as distinct from what Schreiner JA calls
'essentiality').
We have already noted that because apportionment was not
included in the appellant's grounds of objection, an actual apportion-
ment was ruled out by Schreiner and Maisels JJA. This led them to
look for a single dominant causa to settle the issue.
Schreiner and Maisels JJA both implied quite clearly that in an
appropriate case apportionment would be acceptable. This, it is
submitted, would require the ascertainment not of a dominant causa
-' 1967, reported in Republic of Botswana Law Reports 1964-1967 207.
30 At 219.
3' At 219.
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but of two or more legal causae having what we might call 'sufficient
essentiality'-in other words, not too remote-on the basis of which
an apportionment could be made. It is in the context of such a
possibility that the remarks of Schreiner JA, quoted above, are of
great interest, in particular his reference to causae sine qua non and to
'the . . . degree of essentiality'.
It is our contention that in a case where apportionment is pleaded
by the taxpayer in his objection and appeal, expressions such as
'dominant (or main or substantial or real and basic)' would give way
to a test for legal as opposed to factual causation along the lines
indicated by Nicholas JA in the Shell Pension Fund case32 and Corbett
JA in Tuck's case, 33 and implied, if our interpretation is accepted, by
the comments of SchreinerJA cited above.
The Shell Pension Fund case should perhaps be treated with some
caution, as it dealt with paragraph (e) of the definition of gross
income and not with the general definition, and the Transvaal Hide
decision is of course a Botswana decision and not binding in South
Africa (the towering legal stature of Schreiner JA notwithstanding).
On the authority of Tuck's case, however, it is submitted that the
correct inquiry may properly proceed along the following lines.
In determining a causa for the purpose of ascertaining the source
and also the capital or revenue nature of an amount received or
accrued, one must enquire what is the originating cause, or quid pro
quo, giving rise to it. Should this inquiry produce an equivocal result,
it is submitted that one should ascertain the factual cause (or causes)
(conditio(nes) sine qua non) giving rise to the amount, and then
determine whether such cause (or causes), having regard to any novus
actus interveniens, can also be considered as a legal cause (or legal
causes).
It needs to be stressed that the determination of a causa or of causae
in the above manner in no way detracts from any of the traditional
tests for determiniiig the capital or revenue nature of an amount
received or accrued. These tests must simply be applied separately in
relation to each separate causa.
Let us examine the possible -application of these principles of
causation in the context of a typical set of facts giving rise to
difficulties in the determination of the capital or revenue nature of an
amount received. Let us assume that Mr X purchased a piece of land
for an amount of RI million and five years later, having subdivided
the land into individual plots, sold all of the land for RIO million.
The traditional test for determining the capital or revenue nature of
the RIO million received requires us to determine Mr X's intention on
the date of acquisition of the land and to determine whether any
32 Supra note 26.
" Supra note 9.
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change of intention has taken place prior to its disposal. In Com-
missioner for Inland Revenue v Stott3 4 Wessels JA said:
'It is unnecessary to go so far as to say that the intention with which an article or
land is bought is conclusive as to whether the proceeds derived from a sale are
taxable or not. It is sufficient to say that the intention is an important factor and
unless some other factor intervenes to show that when the article was sold it was
sold in pursuance of a scheme of profit-making, it is conclusive in determining
whether it is capital or gross income.' 5
If Mr X acquired the land with a view to the profitable resale of it
(in pursuance of a scheme of profit-making), then, if there has been
no change of intention, the amount of R10 million received will be of
a revenue nature. If, on the other hand, Mr X acquired the land as an
investment (for example, in order to derive rental income from it), he
is entitled to realize his capital asset to best advantage. As Wessels JA
said in Stott's case:
'Every person who invests his surplus funds in land or stock or any other asset is
entitled to realize such asset to best advantage and to accommodate the asset to the
exigencies of the market in which he is selling. The fact that he does so cannot alter
what is an investment of capital into a trade or business for earning profits.'3
If on the other hand Mr X had changed his intention since the date
of acquisition of the land and was holding it as trading stock at the
time of its disposal, the proceeds of R10 million will be characterized
as an amount of a revenue nature.37 In deciding whether Mr X has
changed his intention, it might be discovered that Mr X had mixed
intentions, in which case his dominant intention must prevail.38
The test for capital or revenue is trite law, but it behoves us to ask
how the notion of causation, as enunciated by Corbett JA in Tuck's
case,39 might apply in this context. If we employ the Lever Bros test,
it will be apparent that there are three possible originating causes
giving rise to the R10 million received: the purchase of the land, its
subdivision into plots, and the sale of the land.
In the ascertainment of the capital or revenue nature of the
proceeds, in our opinion the correct procedure is not to determine
which of these possible originating causes is the dominant one, but
rather to determine, where necessary, which cause or causes should in
law be considered as causally relevant factors. In doing so it must be
decided which of these conditiones sine qua non, having regard to
their possible remoteness from the receipt of the proceeds of R10
million, can be considered as causes in law in accordance with the
principles of legal causation. We shall consider four possibilities:
(a) Mr X acquired the land for investment purposes and, without changing
3 1928 AD 252.
s At 264.
36 At 263.
a Natal Estates Ltd v Secretary for Inland Revenue 1975 (4) SA 177 (A).
a Per Schreiner JA in Commissioner of Taxes v I evy 1952 (2) SA 413 (A) at 421pr-A.
31 Supra note 9.
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this capital intention, simply disposed of his asset to best possible
advantage.
In this case, if we apply the test for capital or revenue to each of the
three conditiones sine qua non enumerated above, they will each
point to the same conclusion-that the proceeds are of a capital
nature. There is thus no need to go further and distinguish legal
causation from factual causation.
(b) Mr X acquired the land with a view to the profitable resale of it in a
scheme ofprofit-making, and simply proceeded to carry out this intention
in selling the land for RIO million.
As in the case of (a), an application of the test for capital or revenue
to each of the possible causes points to the same conclusion: the
proceeds are of a revenue nature. Again, there is no need to go further
and distinguish legal causation from factual causation.
(c) Mr X acquired the land for investment purposes but has changed his
intention and embarked on a scheme of profit-making, using the land as
his trading stock.
On the facts assumed, a court would probably (although not
necessarily) base its conclusion that Mr X had changed his intention
on the fact that he had subdivided the land into plots and thereby
'crossed the Rubicon' 4° and embarked on a scheme of profit-making.
In this event it is submitted that Mr X's change of intention would
constitute a novus actus interveniens relegating the purchase of the
land to a (remote) conditio sine qua non or, in the words quoted by
Nicholas JA in the Shell Pension Fund case, a mere 'historical
antecedent or background feature'. 41 Only the subdivision of the land
into plots and the sale of them would then be regarded as causally
relevant factors in law, and the application of the capital or revenue
test to each of these causes would yield the conclusion that the
proceeds of R10 million are of a revenue nature.
(d) Mr X acquired the land with a view to the profitable resale of it in a
scheme ofprofit-naking, but has changed this intention and subsequently
disposed of the land held as a capital asset to best advantage.
Based on the reasoning in (c) above, Mr X's change of intention
would constitute a novus actus interveniens, once again relegating the
purchase of the land to a mere 'historical antecedent ot background
feature'. In this event an application of the capital or revenue test to
each of the causally relevant factors in law-the subdivision of the
land into plots and the sale of them-would lead us to the conclusion
that the proceeds of RIO million are of a capital nature.
We have attempted in the four possibilities set out above to apply
the principles of causation as accepted by the Appellate Division in
Tuck's case42 to the capital or revenue issues arising from the purchase
4o Supra note 37 at 203A.
4 Supra note 27.
42 Supra note 9.
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and sale of an asset, and to marry this approach with the traditional
approach adopted by the courts. If the analysis is correct, what
emerges is that the need to distinguish between factual and legal
causation in the case of the purchase and sale of an asset arises only
where there has been a change of intention on the part of the
taxpayer. Such a change of intention will constitute a novus actus
interveniens, and the conditio(nes) sine qua non which have preceded
it will have become causally irrelevant in law. The test for capital or
revenue, which amounts to a determination of the taxpayer's inten-
tion, need only be applied to each of the subsequent causae, and
these-if indeed there is more than one-will invariably yield the
same conclusion.
It would appear that a taxpayer's change of intention per se can
constitute a novus actus interveniens and only the legal causae which
occur subsequent to it will each require an application of the test for
capital or revenue. It is difficult in the present context to conceive of
the legal causes remaining after the latest novus actus interveniens
leading to divergent conclusions as regards capital or revenue.
It would further appear that where a taxpayer has mixed intentions
which subsequently crystallize into a dominant intention, the advent
of this dominant intention will-following the above reasoning
-itself constitute a novus actus interveniens, resulting in the appli-
cation of the test for capital or revenue only to subsequent causae.
IV APPORTIONMENT
What happens if the inquiry regarding causation results in the
establishment of more than one legal causa for the receipt or accrual
of an amount, and after the capital or revenue tests have been applied
to each, it is determined that the amount comprises both a capital and
a revenue element? Similarly, what if the causation inquiry concludes
that a single amount has a multiplicity of sources both within and
outside of the Republic? Is an apportionment competent under South
African income-tax law? In other words, is it possible for an amount
to be split up so that part of it is to be regarded as arising from a
Republic source and the other part not? Similarly, can a single
amount be split up into capital and revenue components? The
situation envisaged is one where the portions of the amount relating
to the capital and revenue, or Republic and non-Republic source,
elements, as the case may be, cannot be identified as separate
amounts. If separate amounts can be identified, an allocation (as
opposed to an apportionment) is clearly possible. This is trite law.
Before we examine the notion of apportionment in relation to the
source and the capital or revenue nature of an amount, it is appro-
priate to ascertain whether the courts have approved of apportion-
ment in any other income-tax context.
In Secretary for Inland Revenue v Guardian Assurance Holdings (SA)
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Ltd43 the Appellate Division, despite the absence of statutory autho-
rization, approved of the apportionment of expenditure claimed
under s 11(a) of the Act in a case where the taxpayer incurred
expenditure partly of a capital nature and partly of a revenue nature.
The Appellate Division has also approved of the apportionment of
expenditure claimed under s 11(a) where the expenditure was in-
curred in the production of an amount comprised of both income and
exempt income. 44 Where expenditure has been incurred partly for
private purposes and partly for trade purposes, no apportionment is
possible, as s 23(g) of the Act prohibits the deduction of expenditure
which is not 'wholly or exclusively laid out or expended for the
purposes of trade'.
45
Apportionment has also been approved of in the application of
certain of the provisions of s 746 of the Act which deem income to
have accrued to a person in specified circumstances. In order for the
deeming provisions to apply, .one of the requirements to be met is
that a 'donation, settlement or other disposition' must take place as a
result of which income is received by or accrues to a person. In this
regard it has been held that 'other disposition' covers any disposal of
property in which there is an appreciable element of gratuitousness
and liberality or generosity, 47 and that if income has accrued or been
received as a result of both elements of gratuitousness and consider-
ation, there is 'no reason why in those circumstances the income
should not then be apportioned between the two elements'. 48
Apportionment of amounts as between capital and revenue
In Tuck's case49 the Appellate Division approved of the principle of
apportionment where a receipt of an amount, having regard to its
quid pro quo, contained both an income element and an element of a
capital nature. The appellant in this case was the managing director of
a pharmaceutical company who had received certain shares in terms
of a management-incentive plan. The court held that the receipt of the
shares was attributable partly to a restraint-of-trade condition and
43 1976 (4) SA 522 (A).
" Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Rand Selections Corporation Ltd 1956 (3) SA 124 (A);
Commissionerfor Inland Revenue v Nemojim (Pty) Ltd 1983 (4) SA 935 (A). Other cases in which the
courts have, in principle, approved ofapportionment of expenditure laid out for a dual or mixed
purpose are Borstlap v Sekretaris van Binnelandse Inkomste 1981 (4) SA 836 (A); ITC 607 (1945) 14
SATC 366 at 369; Sdconegevel v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1937 CPD 258; ITC 800 (1954)
20 SATC 266; ITC 832 (1956) 21 SATC 320; Local Investment Co v Commissioner of Taxes 1958 (3)
SA 34 (SR); ITC 703 (1950) 17 SATC 208.
s Commissionerfor Inland Revenue v Pick 'n Pay Wholesalers (Pty) Ltd 1987 (3) SA 453 (A); ITC
698 (1950) 17 SATC 97; ITC 734 (1951) 18 SATC 202; ITC 847 (1957) 22 SATC 77. In practice
s 23(g) is not strictly applied, and an apportionment of expenditure incurred both for trade
purposes and for other purposes is often allowed (see Aubrey S Silke, Costa Divaris & Michael
L Stein Silke on South African Income Tax 10 ed (1982) 333).
" Section 7(3)-7.
'7 Ovenstone v Secretary for Inland Revenue 1980 (2) SA 721 (A).
4Per Trollip JA at 740D-E.
4Supra note 9.
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partly to his services rendered, and that as the restraint element was
of a capital nature, an apportionment was appropriate. Corbett JA,
who delivered the unanimous decision of the court, said:
'There is, so far as I am aware, no authority for this proposition in our case law.
Nevertheless, for reasons similar to those stated in the cases quoted in the previous
paragraph,50 it seems to me that in a proper case apportionment provides a sensible
and practical solution to the problem which arises when a taxpayer receives a single
receipt and the quid pro quo contains two or more separate elements, one or more of
which would characterize it as capital. It could hardly have been the intention of the
legislature that in such circumstances the receipt be regarded wholly as an income
receipt, to the disadvantage of the taxpayer, or wholly as a capital receipt, to the
detriment of the fiscus. And it is of some interest to note that the solution of
apportionment in cases of this nature has been adopted in England (see Tilley v
Wales (Inspector of Taxes) [1943] AC 386 at 393-4, 398; Carter v Wadman (H M
Inspector of Taxes) (1946) 28 TC 41 at 52-3) and in Australia (see McLaurin v Federal
Commissioner of Taxation (1961) 8 AITR 180 at 191).' s'
With regard to the basis of apportionment, Corbett JA held that,
having regard to the inherent nature of the receipt and its origin in the
incentive plan, it was not possible to find an arithmetical basis for
apportionment, but he did not regard this as an insurmountable
problem. The court considered that a 50/50 apportionment would be
fair and reasonable.
It is submitted, with respect, that the Appellate Division's accep-
tance in Tuck's case of the principle of apportionment in the circum-
stances in question is unassailable. The determination of the causae
giving rise to the receipt or accrual of an amount and the application
of the normal tests for capital and revenue in respect of each causa is
a procedure that confficts with no statutory rule or precedent. It
involves no more than a natural extension of a principle readily
applied by the Appellate Division in relation to expenditure and
deemed income. The difference between receipts and accruals, on the
one hand, and expenditure and the deeming of income in the
circumstances contemplated in s 7 of the Act, on the other, is not of
such a nature as to preclude the extension of the principle of
apportionment.
Apportionment of amounts as between sources within and outside the
Republic
Can the principle of apportionment be applied in relation to
source?52 In this regard Watermeyer CJ made the following com-
ments in the Lever Bros case:
. The cases quoted are Secretary for Inland Revenue v Guardian Assurance Holdings (SA) Ltd supra
note 43; Borstlap v Sekretaris van Binnelandse Inkomste supra note 44; Commissioner for Inland
Revenue P Nemojim (Pty) Ltd supra note 44; and Ovenstone v Secretaryfor Inland Revenue supra note
47.
s' At 834G-J.
5" The only statutory provision expressly authorizing apportionment is s 30 of the Act, which
provides for an apportionment of income from a business where the business extends beyond the
Republic.
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'Turning now to the problem of locating a source of income, it is obvious that
a taxpayer's activities, which are the originating cause of a particular receipt, need
not all occur in the same place and may even occur in different countries, and,
consequently, after the activities which are the source of the particular "gross
income" have been identified, the problem of locating them may present consid-
erable difficulties, and it may be necessary to come to the conclusion that the
"source" of. a particular receipt is located partly in one country and partly in
another. See remarks of Lord Atkin in Rhodesian Metals Ltd (in liquidation) v
Commissioner of Taxes 1940 AD 432 (PC) at 436. Such a state of affairs may lead to
the conclusion that the whole of a receipt, or part of it, or none of it, is taxable as
income from a source within the Union, according to the particular circumstances
of the case, but I am not aware of any decision which has laid down dearly what
would be the governing consideration in such a case.'s3
Watermeyer CJ left open the question of apportionment, and the
Supreme Court of South Africa has yet to be confronted with the
issue.S4 However, in Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Epstein55
Schreiner JA, in a dissenting judgment, accepted that in certain
circumstances apportionment is possible. He made the following
comments:
'Where work has been done in producing or improving raw material which is sold
elsewhere by the same person, it might be possible to apportion... .'56
At first glance, Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Blacks7 may
appear to support the view that apportionment of amounts as
between different sources is not possible in our income-tax law, and
that when there are two or more originating causes, the location of
the dominant cause prevails at the expense of the other subsidiary
causes. In Black's case the taxpayer, who was resident and carrying on
business as a stockbroker in partnership with others in Johannesburg,
carried on a private business of speculating in shares quoted on the
Johannesburg Stock Exchange. He also had an arrangement with a
London firm of stockbrokers whereby the latter speculated on his
behalf on the London Stock Exchange with moneys remitted to
London by him and moneys advanced on interest by the London
firm. Everything relating to the transactions was done in London
except that, although the London firm was entitled to deal in shares
on the taxpayer's account without his authorization, in the majority
of cases transactions were only effected after confirmation or autho-
rization by the taxpayer over the telephone. The court held that the
source of the income from the London transactions was located in
London.
Although the court did speak of looking for the 'dominant' or
'substantial' or 'real' or 'basic' cause of the income in determining its
source, it is submitted that the use of these terms does not amount to
a rejection of the principle of apportionment. First, the issue of
' Supra note 5 at 451.
s4 In ITC 77 (1927) 3 SATC 72 the Special Court for Hearing Income Tax Appeals authorized
the apportionment of the source of income derived from services rendered.
s 1954 (3) SA 689 (A).
5 At 700G-H. The question of apportionment was not canvassed in the majority judgment.
s" 1957 (3) SA 536 (A).
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apportionment was not raised by either of the parties nor was it even
mentioned by the court. If the court had intended rejection of the
principle of apportionment as a necessary concomitant of its test for
source, one would expect this to have been made explicit and not left
as an implication from the use of the terms referred to. Had the court
intended rejection one would expect some reference to have been
made to Watermeyer CJ's remarks on the question of apportionment
in the Lever Bros case and to Schreiner JA's acceptance of apportion-
ment in Epstein's case. In addition, the court did not find itself
confronted with a situation in which there were two originating
causes for the accrual of the amount in question, one located in South
Africa and one in London, and therefore the issue did not arise. The
court found that the originating cause was, in the alternative, either a
distinct business in London of buying and selling shares or the use of
the taxpayer's capital in London and the making and executing of the
contracts in London.
In the Transvaal Hide case58 the Botswana Court of Appeal referred
with approval to the approach adopted in Black's case of looking for
the 'dominant, or main or substantial or real and basic' cause of the
accrual of income. It then proceeded to follow that approach. At the
same time the court made it clear, as has been mentioned, that as
apportionment was not an issue in the case it was unnecessary to
consider it further. Thus Maisels JA said:
'On the facts of the present case, there would appear to be a good deal to be said
for the view that the income should be apportioned between Botswana and South
Africa; cp. the remarks of Schreiner JA in Commissioner for Inland Revenue v
Epstein .... [Tihe appellant in its objection to the assessments made no claim that
the income should be apportioned, and it is limited to the grounds stated in its
notice of objection.... No more, therefore, need be said on the question of
apportionment.' 5 9
It is clear from the Transvaal Hide case that the court did not regard
the approach of looking for the 'dominant, or main or substantial or
real and basic' cause giving rise to an accrual as precluding the
possibility of apportionment. On the contrary, it appears that if the
appellant in the Transvaal Hide case had claimed an apportionment,
Maisels JA, on the strength of his dictum quoted above, would
probably have obliged.
It is submitted that there is nothing in the Act or in the case law to
prevent a court, when confronted with the issue, from applying the
principle of apportionment to source. It has been applied to expen-
diture and approved in the context of the deeming of income and,
very recently, its application was extended to receipts and accruals in
Tuck's case. 60 No valid objection exists for rejecting its further
extension to source. No doubt the establishment of an acceptable
s Supra note 29.
s Supra note 29 at 224.
o Supra note 9 at 834D-I.
GROSS INCOME: CAUSATION AND APPORTIONMENT 307
basis of apportionment may present difficulties in certain instances,
but such problems are not confined to source. As Corbett JA said in
Tuck's case:
'Having regard to the inherent nature of the receipt and its origin in the plan, it is
not possible to find an arithmetical basis for apportionment. . ., but I do not think
that this should constitute an insuperable obstacle.'61
V THE ONUS OF PROOF
In our view a taxpayer who contends that an amount received by
or accrued to him should be apportioned either as between different
sources or as between capital and revenue will have to raise this
contention as a ground of objection in an objection to an income-tax
assessment. This is because he will in any subsequent litigation be
limited to his grounds of objection.62 Furthermore, a taxpayer who
wishes to argue for an apportionment is required to set out a basis of
apportionment in his objection.
The onus is on the taxpayer to prove that one of the causae giving
rise to a receipt or accrual results in the conclusion that some portion
of the amount is of a capital nature or is not from a source within the
Republic.63 Where the taxpayer contends that an apportionment of an
amount is required, however, the question arises whether he bears the
further onus of establishing an acceptable basis of apportionment.
It may be sufficient for the taxpayer to establish all of the facts
surrounding the relative importance of individual causae and, having
suggested his own apportionment, to leave it to the court to make its
finding on the question of the exact apportionment to be applied. If
the causae justifying an apportionment and their relative importance
have been established by the taxpayer, the legal conclusion is that
some apportionment must be made, and it is our contention that the
court is required to make the apportionment it deems appropriate in
the circumstances.
The approach suggested above accords, it is submitted, with that of
Corbett JA in Tuck's case."
VI CONCLUSION
If what appears above is accepted as an accurate presentation of the
current state of our income-tax law, then it is of fundamental
importance to look to causation when determining whether the
receipt or accrual of any particular amount constitutes gross income.
61 At 834J-835A. The willingness of the legislature to accept apportionment despite the
difficulty it entails is illustrated by the Apportionment of Damages Act 34 of 1956. In terms of
s 1(1)(a) of that Act the court is called upon to reduce the damages recoverable by a claimant to
the extent which it considers just and equitable having regard to the degree in which the claimant
was at fault in relation to the damage suffered.
' Section 83(7)(b) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. In the Transvaal Hide case supra note 29
Schreiner and MaiselsJJA, while not ruling it out in principle, refused to consider apportionment
for precisely this reason.
Section 82 of the Act.
Supra note 9.
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Where two or more causae with differing tax consequences are found
to exist, apportionment as between capital and revenue and as
between different sources is not only competent but mandatory.
These conclusions, to borrow the terminology of Dershowitz
quoted in the introduction, do not amount to grand conceptual
breakthroughs, nor do they even move the law incrementally. The
incremental movement of our income-tax law, to the extent that it
has taken place, is the result of the efforts of our Appellate Division
judges. To borrow again from Dershowitz, we hope only to gain
points for having demonstrated that somebody else has already
thought of the ideas propounded in this article.
WHAT NO LEGISLATURE CAN DO
'[I]t is beyond the power of the Courts, or of an Act of Parliament, to recall
a day that has passed, or make a thing which has happened not have happened.
Non tamen irritum
Quodcunque retro est efficiet
(Hor. III. Carm. 29, 45).
That according to the writer is beyond the power of Omnipotence itself.'
-per MauleJ in Mayor of Berwick v Oswald (1854) 3 El & BI 653 at 670, 118 ER
1286 at 1293.
(The lines from Horace read:
'Non tamen irritum
Quodcunque retro est efficiet; neque
Diffinget, infectum reddet,
Quod fugiens semel hora vexit.'
Translation by H T Riley in Dictionary of Classical Quotations (1909): 'Not
Heaven itself will render ineffectual what is past, or annihilate and undo what the
fleeting hour has once carried away with it.'
Translation by John Dryden (1631-1700):
'Not Heav'n itself upon the past has pow'r;
But what has been, has been, and I have had my hour.')
'The principle asserted is, that one legislature is competent to repeal any [Alct
which a former legislature was competent to pass; and that one legislature cannot
abridge the powers of a succeeding legislature.
'The correctness of this principle, so far as respects general legislation, can
never be controverted. But, if an act be done under a law, a succeeding legislature
cannot undo it. The past cannot be recalled by the most absolute power': per
Marshall CJ in Fletcher v Peck 6 Cranch 87 at 135, 3 Led 162 at 177 (1810) (United
States Supreme Court).
WHY WERE PSYCHIATRISTS INVENTED
Lord Justice Harman is reported to have recalled that in his youth
"psychiatrists had not been invented" and that "no one was any the worse for
it"': Leader 'Expert Witness' New Law Journal 13 October 1966 p 1389 (vol 116
no 5255).
